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THE 1988 BLUES
Admirals, Activists, and the Development of the Chinese
Maritime Identity
Andrew Rhodes

T

he year 1988 marked a critical moment in China’s emergence as a maritime
power. The seven months from February to August 1988 saw not only a major
naval campaign in the Spratly Islands but also the startling cultural phenomenon
of 河殇 (Heshang, or River Elegy), a multiepisode television documentary that
called on China to turn away from tradition to embrace a maritime identity.1
The prodemocracy creators of Heshang and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy (PLAN) leadership had little in common in terms of how they thought
China should be governed, but there is a surprising overlap in the way the two
groups were “selling the sea,” or seeking to forge a more maritime future for China.2 These two parallel stories highlight an important but overlooked historical
moment in the evolution of China’s maritime identity and its commitment to
maritime power.
In China in 1988, several trends were building to a dramatic, and ultimately
violent, crescendo, with major implications for Chinese society and China’s place
in the world. A decade after the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms,
the movement that sought democratic political reforms and a new Chinese culture was developing powerful momentum and ties to the outside world—only to
meet tragic suppression a year later at Tiananmen
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the path to June 1989. But there are intriguing parallels, beyond mere coincidence, in the cultural and naval events of the spring and summer of 1988 that
provide a new lens for viewing the relationship between Chinese culture and
Chinese sea power.
Thirty-two years is not long in the grand sweep of naval history or Chinese
history, but the rapid pace of PLAN development in the twenty-first century
makes 1988 seem rather like the ancient past. The late 1980s are within the living memory of many scholars and strategists, but too few remember the events
of 1988 and the global, regional, and national context in which they took place.
For most Americans, the China of 1988 hides behind two veils—the Tiananmen
Square massacre and the end of the Cold War—that obscure our view of important historical trends. Many of the key trends the world confronts today grew
from seeds that already were germinating, in very recognizable ways, in 1988.
A closer examination of 1988 suggests, for example, that the campaign begun in
2014 to build artificial islands in the Spratly Islands had unprecedented scope
but emerged from actions driven by the “maritime mentality” and specific naval
actions of 1988.3 Revisiting Heshang reveals how PLA leaders in the Xi Jinping
era have echoed the language of 1988’s prodemocracy activists. The PLAN commander in 2014 wrote that China had suffered in the past because it “clung to the
traditional thinking of valuing the land and neglecting the sea,” while the 2015
defense white paper called for China to abandon the “traditional mentality that
land outweighs sea.”4
The next section of this article briefly will review key concepts in the literature
on maritime identity and sea power, and will suggest taking a nuanced view of
China’s evolution from a continental power to a more maritime power. Following
this theory section, the two subsequent sections will explore the cultural dimensions and historical context in which Heshang emerged and the strategic context
of the 1988 naval campaign. The final portions of the article will examine the
interaction of these cultural and naval events, and how such a consideration enriches our understanding of China’s maritime identity. The article will conclude
by arguing that the events of 1988 offer clear evidence that China’s commitment
to sea power has been well under way for more than three decades, and has built
on a surprisingly diverse basis of support over that period.
CONCEPTS OF MARITIME IDENTITY AND
THE PURSUIT OF SEA POWER
The approach of examining 1988 through both cultural and strategic lenses rests
on a strong foundation in the literature on the nature of sea power. Theorists of
sea power broadly agree that a nation’s geographic, political, economic, and cultural contexts shape its relationship with the sea and sea power. As Geoffrey Till
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writes, “seapower is the product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents
that are difficult to tease apart.”5 However, some theorists have emphasized the
nation’s innate characteristics and values that lead to its acquisition and maintenance of sea power, while others have put more weight on the conscious policy
decisions of governments to promote and develop sea power.
The argument that sea power emerges directly from national character has
been compelling to writers from Thucydides to Mahan and has been well argued
more recently by Peter Padfield and Andrew Lambert. In a series of books, Padfield contends that there is a close link between the ability of peoples “ascendant
at sea” to prevail over those “with a territorial power base,” on the one hand,
and the “system of beliefs and of government associated with supreme maritime
power,” on the other. In such a system, merchant wealth leads to “merchant values” and political structures with “dispersed power and open, consultative rule.”
In this sense, the impressive voyages of Ming China in the fifteenth century did
not represent true maritime power, because they were not profit-driven enterprises but instead merely prestige projects “financed by the imperial treasury.”
Padfield also underscores the links between the progressive or disruptive culture
of new media and maritime power.6 Padfield focuses on the innovative media of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the novel and the daily newspaper)
that promoted the values of the merchant class, producing contrasting bases
for maritime power in France, England, and the Netherlands.7 In 1980s China,
television was a similarly new medium that was adapted readily for disruptive
cultural arguments.
More recently, Lambert’s 2018 book argues that there are no pure “seapowers”
in the world today, and history has seen only a small number of true sea powers.
Lambert’s study of how a nation creates a “seapower identity” makes plain that
sea power is a function of cultural factors far more than political, economic, or
military ones. In this very broad cultural argument, Lambert states emphatically
that the real “soul of seapower” must be sought in the culture of a state, and he
chooses to invoke art historians and critics, such as Jacob Burckhardt and John
Ruskin, as being more relevant to the matter than Mahan’s elements of sea power,
which, Lambert argues, address “only the strategic surface.”8
Jakub Grygiel also considers many centuries of the history of sea power, but in
studying ancient China he finds conclusions different from those of Lambert and
Padfield. Grygiel’s analysis of the Ming dynasty leads him to argue that the Ming
retreat from the sea after the voyages of Zheng He “was not a product of deeply
embedded cultural values peculiar and eternal to China. Rather it was a historically specific policy that proved to be a costly mistake.”9 In considering modern
Chinese grand strategy and the country’s ambitions as a rising power, Chinese
and foreign scholars have investigated the influence of Mahanian maritime
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thinking in China and debated whether a continental orientation—sometimes
associated with the geopolitical theory of Halford Mackinder—holds more
explanatory power.10 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara find clear evidence of
Mahanian tendencies in Chinese leaders since Deng and even some appreciation
for naval power in Mao Zedong. But Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that “sea
power is a conscious political choice,” and they dedicate a chapter of Red Star over
the Pacific to China’s “strategic will to the sea.”11 Several recent Chinese authors,
some of them PLAN officers, have pointed to a lack of 海洋意识 (maritime consciousness) or insufficient 海权意识 (awareness of sea power) for China’s past
defeats, such as in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.12
These theorists offer useful frameworks for thinking about the connection between Chinese culture and sea power in 1988, but simplistic cultural arguments
fall short where they underappreciate the dynamism of China’s national character
in the 1980s and how much China’s leaders and people willed the nation toward
a more maritime future. Lambert may set too high a bar for qualification as a sea
power, but his articulation of the ideal serves as a useful reminder that most states
exist somewhere on a spectrum between continental and maritime power. Bruce
Swanson wrote in the early 1980s that “Chinese naval history over the past millennium has been characterized between two great cultural entities: continental,
Confucianist China and maritime China.”13 Indeed, as we will see below, this
dichotomy is a central theme of Heshang.
However, Lambert is far too dismissive in his assessment that China never will
be a true sea power, that its “attitudes towards the sea remain profoundly negative,” and that its construction of artificial islands reflects a “Great Wall” mentality that is “the antithesis of seapower identity.”14 Although China was not about
to become another Venice in 1988, key cultural and naval moments of mid-1988
challenge Lambert’s argument. Heshang shows clearly that the prodemocracy activists of 1988 shared Padfield’s vision of a close link between democracy and the
sea: that Chinese maritime power indeed was “driven by merchant mariners for
profit” and not driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or “by the court
for prestige, luxury, and sheer curiosity.”15 Holmes and Yoshihara are right to note
Mahanian tendencies among China’s leaders, although the 1988 case suggests
that this has more to do with Mahan’s advocacy for the conscious buildup of naval
power than his emphasis on the economic basis of sea power.
The concept of strategic culture knits together the role of national culture
and the specific choices a nation makes in pursuit of a strategic goal such as the
development of sea power. There are various definitions for strategic culture and
a healthy debate over the explanatory power of the concept, but thinking about
the Chinese strategic culture of 1988—as a “system of symbols” or “modes of
thought and action” derived from the “national historical experience”—enriches
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our understanding of China’s choices and behavior in 1988 and the decades that
followed.16 Of particular note for thinking about 1988, Alastair Iain Johnston describes the value of “cultural artifacts” such as those from the fields of cinema and
literature as lenses for examining the roots of strategic behavior and decisions.17
Heshang is just such a cultural artifact; it creates new ways of understanding 1988
as an essential moment in China’s long-term development of a maritime identity
and its pursuit of sea power.
THE DECADE LEADING TO HESHANG
As a cultural artifact, an explicitly prodemocracy documentary on a Chinese
state–run television network did not occur in a vacuum; it was the result of a
decade of increasing openness in Chinese cultural and political discourse. This
spirit had precedent in Chinese history, and many of the intellectuals calling for
continued reform in 1988 explicitly invoked earlier moments of openness and
forward thinking, such as the Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing
dynasty. This movement sought to capture foreign knowledge and technology,
and leading Qing officials, such as Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, sought to
break Western domination of China’s maritime economy by importing Western
maritime know-how and establishing a Chinese shipping industry.18 Reformers
in the 1980s also harked back to the 1919 May Fourth Movement, which not
only launched the modern era of Chinese politics but opened a period “marked
by cosmopolitanism and a desperate thirst for things new and foreign.” The
1980s saw a similar cosmopolitan thirst. Despite several periods of “conservative
backlash”—in 1981, 1983, and 1987—that thirst grew more powerful each time.19
Writing just prior to Tiananmen, Ralph Crozier described the dominant
cultural theme of China from 1985 to 1988 as “going to the world,” as Chinese
artists adapted Western artistic forms and sought to create a new Chinese modernism, rather than just recycling traditional Chinese art.20 The national leadership echoed this external focus in its designation of 1988 as an “International
Year of Tourism.”21 The 1987 film 红高粱 (Hong Gaoliang, or Red Sorghum),
which features themes of rejecting the backward and feudal countryside, enjoyed
domestic success and became the first Chinese film to win major international
prizes.22 The hands-off approach of the CCP leadership in declining to pass
judgment on the artistic merits of this film that became a cultural sensation was
notable. More shocking was the late-1988 opening of a controversial but successful exhibit of nude paintings at Beijing’s National Gallery of Art.23 Not only was
this the first mainstream exhibit of nudes in the history of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), but the paintings were created by teachers at the Central Academy of Fine Arts rather than being imported from abroad. A final cross-cultural
example from 1988, with a tie to the depiction of navies in popular culture, was
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the staging at Beijing’s Capital Theater of an all-Chinese production of The Caine
Mutiny, directed by Charlton Heston.24 The popularity of this World War II naval
story in 1988—some three decades after its mainstream success in America as a
novel, film, and play—no doubt raised interesting questions about wartime duty,
the abstract ideals of the naval profession, and the potentially seditious notion of
ousting an unfit leader.25
The cultural movement of the 1980s extended beyond the world of intellectuals and art connoisseurs. Western books of all types became widely available in
China, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) opened its first restaurant in China at the
end of 1987, and televisions and television stations proliferated rapidly across
the country.26 The spread of television, in particular, was essential to allowing
Heshang to reach a massively larger audience than any of the other 1988 highculture events in Beijing.
Against this background, Heshang appeared, to great acclaim and popularity,
in June 1988. A group of young Chinese filmmakers had begun work on the series
early that year, even as a thirty-part, apolitical documentary called Yellow River,
on which several of them had worked, was airing.27 Concentrating so heavily
on that river in this initial project inspired writers such as Su Xiaokang to use
the river as a symbol in exploring provocative cultural and political messages.28
Heshang developed into a documentary of six parts, each organized around a different theme. As a work of art, Heshang is subject to multiple interpretations that
may or may not match the creators’ intent at the time, a factor intensified by the
collaborative nature of the project. Richard Bodman, who translated Heshang and
wrote the introduction to a guide to the series, emphasizes that the organization
into thematic episodes and the reliance on symbolic images make any simple
summary “interpretive,” representing “only one possible reading.”29 Nevertheless,
there are general themes running through Heshang that speak to the debate over
China’s relationship to the sea.
The first five parts cover various aspects of Chinese history and culture,
highlighting the failures of many generations of Chinese leaders to keep pace
with a world that was leaving the nation behind. These episodes question and
attack China’s traditional identity while articulating a different patriotic, and occasionally nationalistic, mood to call for a different future for China.30 Of note,
part 2, “Destiny,” invokes the Great Wall as evidence of backward thinking and
dismisses the fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He as a brief vanity project that
failed to take advantage of a historic opportunity to join the age of exploration.
The writers of episode 2 argue that Chinese traditional culture continued to cause
China to miss out on the opportunities created by the sea long after Zheng He,
and that China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had been centuries in the making. Also notable to this discussion is part 4, “The New Era,” which contrasts the
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failed policies of the Maoist era with the rapid but disruptive success of reforms
under Deng Xiaoping, with a particular emphasis on the economic policies of
Zhao Ziyang, the CCP leader in 1988 who carried forward Deng’s reforms with a
particular focus on developing China’s coastal regions.
However, it is Heshang’s sixth episode, “Blueness,” that makes the boldest
political statements and is the most explicitly maritime in both substance and
symbolism. Part 6, written by Xie Xuanjun and Yuan Zhiming, opens with a
view of Earth from space, calling Earth a blue planet, one dominated by blue seas
from which all life emerged. A quick summary of human history then invokes
the linked emergence of democracy and sea power in Athens; highlights the connections between a maritime economy and the rise of industrial capitalism; and
concludes that ships have carried trade, colonization, science, and democracy,
such that “‘blueness’ came to symbolize the destiny of the modern world.”31 After
a review of China’s humiliation in the Opium Wars, the episode explicitly links
cultural barriers and sea power with the story of Yan Fu, a Qing dynasty scholar
sent to study at Britain’s Royal Naval College at Greenwich from 1877 to 1879. On
his return to China, Yan became dean of the Tianjian Naval Academy, which had
just been established by Li Hongzhang, and Yan participated in the short-lived
Hundred Days of Reform that began 11 June 1898 (as it happened, Heshang first
aired on the movement’s ninetieth anniversary, 11 June 1988).32 According to
episode 6 of Heshang, Confucian tradition prevented Yan Fu from bringing naval
consciousness back to China, whereas Hirobumi Ito, a Japanese student in England at the same time, became a leading reformer in Japan, drafted the country’s
first constitution, and was prime minister during the 1894 Sino-Japanese War.
This vignette serves the arguments in episode 6 but represents a very loose interpretation of the history. The Qing dynasty was less adept at naval modernization than were the Japanese, but it did continue substantial investment in China’s
naval forces—particularly the modern battleships of the Beiyang Fleet—in the
years after Yan returned from England, and there is no evidence to support the
assertion in Heshang that Yan and Ito were classmates at Greenwich.33 Heshang’s
take on the history of Qing naval modernization is superficial and flawed, but
the vignette highlights again that the filmmakers were drawing on a rich and
continuous tradition among Chinese intellectuals since the nineteenth century
who have called for China selectively to embrace foreign ideas and technology to
make China powerful and prosperous.34
Episode 6 continues with a full-scale attack on Confucianism and land-based
culture, arguing that, while a continental mentality may produce nuclear weapons and a space program, only blueness can “infuse the whole nation with a
strong, civilizing vitality.” The episode then praises the post-1978 reforms, particularly the role of intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and Zhao’s coastal strategy—a
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PHOTO 1

Images captured from extracts of Heshang posted to YouTube.
Source: 河殇 [River Elegy], aired June 1988 on China Central Television, available at www.youtube.com/.

direct parallel to Padfield’s arguments about the tight connections among national power, intellectual freedom, and a merchant-led maritime economy. This
section of episode 6 includes the closest connection to the PLAN’s 1988 campaign
in the Spratlys; it calls the April 1988 elevation of Hainan Island, in the South
China Sea, to provincial status a “historical undertaking” and states that Hainan’s
economic success would “necessarily give a new color to China’s culture.”35
Heshang proved wildly popular when it first aired in June 1988, and audience
demand led to a second television airing in August. The script was printed in
newspapers nationwide, including the CCP official newspaper People’s Daily, and
a book edition went through five printings between June and September 1988.36
The rapid spread of Heshang’s themes sparked debate among Chinese intellectuals—and controversy within the Chinese leadership. In late 1988, some scholars
tried to take a moderate course, praising parts of Heshang while holding that
some of its messages, such as those in part 6, were extreme and unnecessarily offensive to conservative leaders.37 One of these leaders was party elder Wang Zhen,
who was enraged by the documentary’s assault on traditional culture. General
Secretary Zhao, on the other hand, endorsed Heshang’s proreform messages.38
These deep fissures in the party leadership soon would have cataclysmic results. Within months of Heshang’s broadcast, student-led prodemocracy protests
broke out across China, leading to the ouster of Zhao and the bloody crackdown
at Tiananmen Square. In the months following the suppression of the protests,
the CCP launched a full-scale propaganda assault on Heshang, formally banning
it for allegedly fomenting unrest and promoting “bourgeois liberalism” in the
service of “international reactionary force.”39 Su Xiaokang became the target of a
nationwide manhunt, and the creators of Heshang, many of whom were graduate students, joined other leaders of the democracy movement on the flight into
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exile. It is perhaps only appropriate that many dissidents, including Su, reportedly
made their escape by sea, aboard smugglers’ speedboats to Hong Kong.40
THE DECADE LEADING TO JOHNSON REEF
In the months before Heshang’s first broadcast, Sino-Vietnamese tensions
mounted in the South China Sea, leading to the naval battle at Johnson Reef
on 14 March 1988 and the ensuing PLA occupation of features in the Spratly
Islands. Just as Heshang marked a pivotal moment in the cultural discourse of the
late 1980s, the Johnson Reef battle occurred within the broad context of China’s
emergence as a maritime power. Geopolitical, commercial, and operational concerns steadily increased Beijing’s focus on the South China Sea throughout the
1980s.
Other scholars have covered amply the scope of China’s economic growth in
the 1980s as the country participated more and more in the international trading system. It is important to remember, however, that energy dependence was
not yet a primary concern for Beijing in the 1980s; the country remained a net
exporter of oil throughout the decade. Even though China’s merchant marine had
grown rapidly and already was a major part of the global shipping industry by
1988, discussions of the economic importance of the sea did not yet emphasize
commerce protection, defense of sea lines of communication, or the security of
Chinese-flag ships.41
Beijing was, however, very concerned about ocean resources, including fish,
offshore petroleum, and seabed minerals (and remains so today).42 The Chinese
fishing fleet had particular importance in this period for the development of
nonnaval instruments of maritime power, particularly the growth of maritimelaw-enforcement and maritime-militia forces, which have become major players
in twenty-first-century regional disputes. Maritime militias have played a role
throughout the history of the PRC, helping to defend against coastal raids by the
Kuomintang forces on Taiwan in the 1950s and participating in the 1974 battles
in the Paracel Islands.43
The 1985 establishment of the Tanmen Militia, named for a fishing village
near Qionghai, is directly relevant to understanding the South China Sea in the
1980s. This militia’s founder played a central role in spreading word about the fish
resources available in the Spratly Islands, and between 1985 and 1988 he organized investment in new boats and expeditions to the distant fishing grounds.44
The efforts of the Tanmen Militia directly link China’s growing exploitation of
resources in the South China Sea to Beijing’s efforts to assert control and jurisdiction in disputed areas and provide mutual support between the PLAN and
paramilitary maritime forces. The ties between the PLAN and the Tanmen Militia deepened quickly, and militia forces played a direct role in the first Spratlys
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MAP 1

The South China Sea, shown from the perspective of mainland China, in an oblique orthographic projection.
Source: Author.

construction campaign, in 1988.45 The Tanmen Militia continues to be involved
in high-profile clashes, such as the incident at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in 2014.46
Cold War geopolitics made the international environment of 1988 fundamentally different from the current situation. During the 1980s, China and the United
States were closely aligned against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, including
in the form of U.S. arms sales to the PLA, signals-intelligence cooperation, and
Chinese support to arm the Afghan mujahideen.47
Immediately relevant to the South China Sea was the other common enemy
that China and the United States then shared: Vietnam.48 Although China’s 1979
invasion of Vietnam was short, it was bloody, and the border conflict continued
throughout the 1980s, with occasional major battles, particularly in the Laoshan
sector from 1984 to 1987.49 One of the last phases—and the only primarily naval
phase—of the long limited war between China and Vietnam took place in 1988.
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PHOTO 2

Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 1987.
Source: A High-Altitude View and Map of the Soviet Base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 6412398, 1987, photograph, National Archives
and Records Administration.

On the other hand, the logic of shared enemies steadily deepened ties between Hanoi and Moscow through the 1970s and 1980s, and the strength of this
relationship was clearly evident at the closest major military base to the Spratly
Islands: Cam Ranh Bay. The United States had expanded Cam Ranh greatly
during its war in Indochina. Afterward, the Soviets continued the expansion for
their own benefit; by the mid-1980s, Cam Ranh Bay hosted the largest number
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of Soviet warships based outside the Soviet Union, while Soviet medium-range
bombers with antiship missiles were based at the adjacent airfield.50 Sino-Soviet
relations improved with the rise of Gorbachev in 1985, but the PLA did not shift
its strategic focus formally away from its northern neighbor until 1993.51
The CCP leadership had paid attention, albeit with inconsistent focus, to the
South China Sea since the founding of the People’s Republic. The PLA conquered
Hainan in 1950, occupied part of the Paracel Islands in 1970, and seized the rest
of the Paracels from a collapsing South Vietnam in 1974. Indeed, the architect of
the reform era, Deng Xiaoping, personally oversaw the 1974 operation from the
offices of the PLA General Staff.52 Given Deng’s personal experience and Zhao’s
focus on the new Hainan Province as a flagship reform project, in the 1980s the
South China Sea became an important issue for the most-senior leadership.53
The PLAN of 1988 was a pale shadow of the naval force into which it has
evolved today, but important developmental trends were well under way in the
1980s. Several excellent studies have discussed the role of Admiral Liu Huaqing
in creating the modern PLAN in the late 1970s and the 1980s, most of them
derived from Liu’s published memoirs.54 The force structure of the 1980s increasingly centered on a core of China’s first generation of indigenously built
warships, such as the Type 051 destroyers and Type 035 submarines. The 1980s
also saw important progress in developing second-generation combatants, such
as the Type 052 destroyers and improved Type 053 frigates, that would debut in
the 1990s and set the stage for the PLAN’s modern, twenty-first-century fleet.55
But beyond Liu’s modernizing reforms and advocacy of aircraft carriers, it is
important to recall that Liu was the standard-bearer for a different kind of navy
for a different kind of China. When Liu became PLAN commander in 1982,
China was only six years removed from the peak influence of the “Gang of Four,”
whose members represented both a radical bloc that “opposed the development
of an oceanic navy” and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution that had stagnated
Chinese naval and commercial maritime development.56 Following the death of
Mao and the rise of Deng, the path was clearer for Liu to call for changing the
PLAN’s strategy from “near-seas defense” to “offshore defense,” with a long-term
goal of developing a blue-water navy.57 Swanson wrote, in 1982, that the five years
since the arrest of the Gang of Four had launched a “tremendous maritime renascence” for China, although Bernard Cole argues that the period of ideological
impediments to naval modernization only fully ended with the Gang of Four’s
trial in 1981.58 The PLAN made important early steps toward its goal in the 1980s
with the mastery of underway replenishment and the service’s first overseas
goodwill cruise, in 1985, to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.59
Seen within this context, the scope of the PLAN’s operations demonstrates
that the Spratlys occupation was not a small, isolated skirmish but actually
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constituted the PLAN’s first blue-water campaign. Beijing formally approved
the establishment of a permanent Spratlys presence at the end of 1987, and
construction began, with heavy militia support, at Fiery Cross Reef in February
1988.60 A major focus of the PLAN’s campaign was logistics support to outpost
construction, but the PLAN also sustained a large presence of combat forces
during and after the 14 March clash at Johnson Reef, which left one Vietnamese
vessel sunk, at least one more damaged, and a number of Vietnamese sailors
dead. In mid-1988, the PLAN deployed some forty warships over five hundred
nautical miles from the nearest friendly harbor.61 The ships came from all three
PLAN fleets; the deliberate use of units from across the navy is notable as a parallel to the PLA’s rotation of ground forces to the Vietnam border throughout the
1980s, to distribute combat experience across the force.62 By July, construction
was complete at Fiery Cross Reef and five other previously unoccupied features.
In interviews, Chen Weiwen, the PLAN commander in the Johnson Reef battle,
described efforts to fortify the newly occupied features, particularly in light of
the threat of Vietnamese air attack. Chen, who previously had participated in the
1974 Paracels battle, was promoted to rear admiral in September 1988, went on
to serve in a variety of senior PLAN positions, and attended the Central Party
School.63
The 1988 campaign was, in many ways, the operational manifestation of the
narrative of naval power that the PLAN and the CCP leadership were building.
Not unlike the makers of Heshang, China’s navalists were advancing a controversial argument about pulling China toward a bluer future. This meant advocating
for a more capable navy, selling its importance to national development, and
demonstrating its effectiveness in battle.64 On one level, such advocacy was typical parochial behavior by a military bureaucracy—the costs of naval development
can be a hard sell in all political systems. John Garver concludes that “although
the rationale for Chinese expansion in the South China Sea during the 1980s
shifted from primarily geostrategic to primarily economic, the operations were
intimately related throughout the 1970s and 1980s to PLAN efforts to modernize
and to the domestic fights over budget to finance this.”65
China continued to commit to building naval power and militarizing its
South China Sea outposts throughout the following year; even as CCP leaders
debated how to respond to student protests in 1989, the PLAN worked to solidify its presence. The PLA in 1989 enlarged the airfield at Woody Island in the
Paracels and “a Spratly Front Line Headquarters was established to command a
six-month campaign of intensified construction.”66 Given the growing focus on
ocean resources and early indications of the importance of trade, the economic
imperatives attached to naval power were starting to become clear to Chinese
leaders in 1988.
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THE CULTURAL AND STRATEGIC IMPETUS BEHIND
CHINA’S MARITIME IDENTITY
Although Lambert indulges in some uncompelling caricatures of China and
the Chinese navy, his core thesis on the centrality of culture to sea-power identity nonetheless has great value for considering the evolution of the naval and
maritime consciousness of China from the 1980s to the present. Like Heshang,
more-recent cultural phenomena also have given a sense of the Chinese popular
conception of the country’s relationship to the global maritime economy and
the PLAN’s role in the international system. The recent action blockbusters Wolf
Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea have nothing in common with Heshang in terms
of tone or style, but they do share a vision of a proud, international China that
fully participates in (and defends) the blue economy.67 They also share a perhaps
unexpected level of popularity; Heshang and Red Sorghum became national and
international sensations in 1988, while the 2017 and 2018 action films are two
of the three highest-grossing Chinese films of all time and garnered tremendous
attention abroad for the popularity of their jingoistic messages.68 A more direct
comparison might be between Heshang and the 2006 twelve-part China Central
Television documentary 大国崛起 (Daguo Jueqi, or The Rise of the Great Powers), which aired twice and was a “ratings miracle.” Andrew Erickson and Lyle
Goldstein describe how Daguo Jueqi summarizes the conclusions of China’s top
scholars who study the path to greatness of both land powers and sea powers.69
Daguo Jueqi, like Heshang, concludes that maritime power and international markets are key to China’s future; however, unlike Heshang, Daguo Jueqi was squarely
consistent with the party line of 2006.
Foreign analysts tend to fixate on the tactical events of the 14 March 1988
clash at Johnson Reef and play down the larger importance of the 1988 PLAN
campaign. At the national level, neither validating military strategy nor testdriving Liu’s modernizing PLAN appears to have been a motivation for the
1988 campaign, but there is a compelling argument that the clash with Vietnam
and successful militarization of the Spratlys served as what Rebecca Lissner
calls a “strategic crucible” that gave Beijing real-world combat experience that
confirmed its ability to pursue a more maritime approach to grand strategy.70
Lissner’s work discusses China in regard to the initial 1979 invasion only briefly,
but the addition of the 1988 naval case study would support her conclusion that
conflict with Hanoi validated the PLAN modernization program, PLA theories
of limited conflict, and Beijing’s overall approach to expanding control steadily
over the South China Sea. These events undoubtedly are salient in the living and
institutional memory of the officers running the PLAN today.71 The flagship of
the PLAN task force at Johnson Reef (the frigate Yingtan, No. 531) has been on
display at the Qingdao Naval Museum for decades. In early 2020, a new memorial
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hall to Chen Weiwen and the March 1988 battle was set to open in Chen’s hometown in Guangdong Province, on the thirty-second anniversary of the battle (the
COVID-19 pandemic delayed the event).72
Is all this simply a matter of historical coincidence, or does a cultural artifact
such as Heshang truly help explain the rise of Chinese sea power? Given that the
Spratly Islands campaign was well under way when Heshang aired, would China’s
quest to become a maritime great power have been inhibited had this documentary never appeared on television? Heshang mentions naval power at several
points but never specifically invokes the PLAN, which is somewhat surprising
in the context of events in the South China Sea that were reported publicly at
the time. This omission could suggest that the creators of Heshang were far more
interested in political and cultural reform than the nature of maritime power
within the international system. Nevertheless, Heshang’s praise for the entrepreneurial class and the maritime economy is consistent with the “constituents
of seapower” that build public and elite support for naval power.73 This theme
in Heshang helps explain why the massacre of June 1989 had little effect on the
PLAN. The PLAN played no role in suppressing student demonstrations, but it
also suffered no political backlash for its embrace of what many in China might
see as Western, imperialist ideas of what a navy ought to be. In a different political era, the post-Tiananmen backlash could have sought to reel back the PLAN’s
move toward “blueness.”
In both the political and maritime arenas, China in 1988 was destined for
violence. The naval development under way in 1988 proved itself in combat and
carried forward into decades of pro-PLAN policies, while the CCP crushed the
cultural and political openness of that decade at Tiananmen Square.
That the PLAN successfully continued to promote a blue-water identity after
1988–89 owes much to the leadership of Liu Huaqing in the 1980s and modernizers such as Zhang Wannian in the 1990s. But it also suggests that the creators
of Heshang were onto something. By 1988, parts of the CCP leadership, the
PLAN, leading commercial interests, and prodemocracy intellectuals all believed that China’s future was “blue.” This conviction is undoubtedly far greater
now within the PLAN than it was in 1988. On this narrow but profound point,
both the PLAN and Heshang were “selling the sea” at the same time. The 1989
crackdown and the entrenched authoritarianism that has reached new heights
under Xi Jinping have sought to exorcise notions of democracy and openness
from China’s maritime identity, but otherwise China has embraced the “blueness” called for in part 6 of Heshang. The experience of 1988 makes evident that
China’s pursuit of sea power and a maritime future was well under way three
decades ago. Heshang proved tragically wrong in terms of the prospects for
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transforming the PRC into a democratic state, but it was quite right about the
emerging Chinese maritime identity.
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